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4ABSTRACT
This paper covers recent trends in a series of broad indicators of
the financial health of the Government of Kerala with its developmental
policy as the backdrop. It examines fiscal balances in Kerala that are not
only important for macroeconomic reasons and Finance Commission
mandated incentives but also for its own fiscal sustainability, and
identifies revenue expenditures as the prime but not the sole determinant.
The paper notes improvements in several fiscal indicators in the areas of
indebtedness and expenditure pattern but relative stagnation in revenue
mobilisation; it concludes that further fiscal consolidation is both
necessary and feasible, pointing out some broad measures to achieve
the same.
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51. Introduction and Broad Trends
At the beginning of the last decade, which also was the beginning
of the 21st century, government finances in Kerala were in doldrums.
The ‘White Paper’ brought out by the state government in June 2001
admitted that much in no uncertain terms while spelling out ‘the crisis
that the State exchequer is facing today’ while conducting ‘an analysis
of the fiscal scenario’ and ‘an assessment of the total resources required
at this juncture’. According to the White Paper, the “…Government is
unable to fulfil its sovereign commitments to the people.  It is unable to
pay cash on cheques issued or make payments on items already included
in the budget document.”1 “Courts are time and again ordering
attachment of Government property, vehicles and furniture for failure to
pay liabilities in time.  There have been instances of contractors not
being able to receive the payments for works undertaken by them…the
Government has duly sanctioned those works and they, on their part,
have executed the contracts.  But, yet they are not being paid what is due
to them.  In quite a few cases, the Hon’ble High Court has had to intervene
and order clearance of the dues.”2 This sorry state of affairs was bad enough
on the basis of the state government accounts alone; it was further
exacerbated when the public sector (i.e. including the state level public
enterprises, particularly the State Electricity Board) were considered.
Further, this was no transient cash-flow problem – it was clearly a structural
problem that was building up over a long period of time.
1. Government of Kerala (2001), p.3.
2. Government of Kerala (2001), p.4.
6The adverse fiscal situation was considered by some researchers
to be a part of a more general problem of unsustainable policy stance
adopted by the state over a long period of time (see, for example, George,
1999 and Tharamangalam, 1998). This line of argument basically held
that the ‘Kerala model’ of investing heavily in social infrastructure
ignored physical infrastructure and industrial growth. While this policy
did catapult Kerala into the limelight as an exemplary state in terms of
human development, the financial returns to such investment for the
state government, if any, were meagre, but the lasting expenditure
liabilities were large, leading to an inherently unsustainable financial
scenario. Large scale remittances from outside the state and income
from plantations of cash crops could mitigate this lack of sustainability
only to some extent and for only so long – the crisis in the state finances
was inevitable.
Even so, a decade later, the state finances are clearly in a better
position3, as we shall see in the rest of this paper, although certain
worrying features continue. This paper documents this change, tries to
identify the areas of improvement that have driven this change and also
points out weak spots that need to be attended to in the interest of
preventing further recurrence of crisis in state finances.
Annual figures of fiscal balances are most often used as summary
indicators of changes in fiscal health; before the revenue and fiscal
deficits of Kerala are presented below following this tradition, it may
not be out of place to briefly discuss their significance and relevance at
the state level. The central government and prompted by it, successive
Finance Commissions since the Tenth have been pushing for state level
measures to contain their revenue and fiscal deficits, mainly to promote
3. In a recent paper, George and Krishnakumar (2012) also agree; this paper
covers similar ground as the present one, with differing emphasis on various
aspects. As such, their contribution and the present one, prepared
independently, could be considered complementary to each other.
7macroeconomic stability. It is actually the primary responsibility of the
centre to maintain such stability, and the incentives to the states to
control their deficits within a given level (same for all the states) smacks
of insensitivity towards the individual states’ developmental concerns
as also shifting the responsibility for macroeconomic stability,
particularly when the centre does not follow its own fiscal correction
path. However, their own fiscal balances are of importance to the states
too, for a different set of reasons. First, given that states have no way of
financing their deficits except by increasing their liabilities, low revenue
deficits are necessary to ensure that the debt financing is confined to
expenditures with at least expected positive rates of return, without
which financial sustainability of the government can progressively
worsen. Second, higher deficits translate into higher debt or liabilities,
which automatically raise the cost of debt particularly for medium- and
low-income states. Third, even without the cost of debt increasing, higher
deficits mean higher indebtedness and hence higher interest costs leading
to still higher deficits and a vicious spiral towards financial
unsustainability. Kerala has tottered on the brink of such precipice already
at the beginning of our reference period, as mentioned at the outset.
Thus, while the straightjacket approach of the Finance Commissions
may not be ideal from the point of view of the states in general and for
Kerala in particular, a concern about the fiscal balances is certainly
relevant in view of its past experiences.
Broad deficit indicators of Kerala – revenue, fiscal and primary
deficits – for the period 2001-02 to 2011-12 as ratios of Gross State
Domestic Product (GSDP) in current prices are depicted below in Figure
1. It can be seen that at the beginning of our reference period, revenue,
fiscal and primary deficits became larger till 2003-04. The highest fiscal
deficit was in 2002-03 at 5.3 percent of GSDP which was about the same
in the next financial year. The highest revenue and primary deficits
during the reference period were also recorded in 2002-03. All the deficit
figures improved after 2003-04 reaching the lowest values of the decade
8in 2006-07, with primary deficits changing to a small primary surplus.
Immediately afterwards, there was an increase in the deficits, but the
figures were relatively stable (with small fluctuations) till 2009-10.
Figures for 2010-11 show that fiscal deficits have improved from 3.39
percent of GSDP in 2009-10 to 2.79 in 2010-11; similarly, revenue and
primary deficits also shrunk noticeably between 2009-10 and 2010-11.
However, all the deficit indicators are expected to rise significantly in
2011-12.
Figure 1:  Changing Fiscal Balances
Similar trends with minor variations can actually be observed
for most states in India during this period, suggesting common influences.
There are three common factors that are cited: the introduction of fiscal
responsibility legislations strongly advocated by the 12th Finance
Commission with substantial incentives, the high growth phase of the
Indian economy that facilitated higher revenue generation by the states,
and high growth in central tax revenues that benefited the state finances
via the shared taxes. The recent deterioration in fiscal balances is also a
cross-state phenomenon. It would be instructive to break down the
change in fiscal deficits by its components to get a broad idea about the
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Table 1: Decomposition of Changes in Fiscal Deficit
Items 2001-02 2002-03 2006-07 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 (RE)
Fiscal Deficit -3.88 -5.31 -2.49 -3.39 -2.79 -3.46
Own Tax Revenue 7.03 7.77 7.77 7.58 7.84 8.10
Own Non-tax Revenue 0.64 0.72 0.61 0.80 0.70 0.84
Shared Taxes 1.91 1.82 2.09 1.89 1.86 1.89
Grants 1.16 1.00 1.36 0.96 0.79 1.29
Revenue Expenditure 13.84 15.70 13.54 13.40 12.51 13.79
Of which, interest payments 2.95 3.14 2.72 2.28 2.05 1.95
Capital Expenditure 0.66 0.74 0.59 0.89 1.21 1.51
Net Loans and Advances 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.36 0.26 0.28
Source: Finance Accounts (various) and Budget documents of 2012-13, Kerala.
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nature of adjustments that took place and the relative contribution of
the components to the overall fiscal adjustment. Table 1 is designed to
facilitate this decomposition.
It can be seen that the deterioration in fiscal deficit in 2002-03
(the year with the largest deficits) was despite increases in own revenues
– both tax and non-tax. All other components contributed to the higher
fiscal deficit, but the largest contribution was that of revenue
expenditures. If we consider the change between 2002-03 and 2006-07
(lowest fiscal deficit), it presents a mirror image of the previous case,
with a large reduction in revenue expenditures having the largest
contribution in reducing fiscal deficit, even when own revenues declined.
Further, reduction in interest payments played some role, but not a
dominant one, in reducing revenue expenditures, implying a significant
amount of genuine expenditure compression. Again, the increase in
fiscal deficit in 2009-10 from 2006-07 was despite an increase in own
revenues (this time mainly thanks to increasing non-tax revenues),
attributable in equal measure to reduction in central transfers (both
shared taxes and grants) and increase in all expenditure items (though
the largest increase was in capital expenditures). The reduction in fiscal
deficit in 2010-11 is largely attributable to a one percentage point decline
in revenue expenditures. The expected rise in fiscal deficit in 2011-12
is again largely attributable to increase in revenue expenditures. The
decomposition of changes in fiscal deficit thus clearly points to the
crucial role played by revenue expenditures in most cases. Another
point of interest is that substantive increases in expenditures are
accompanied by increases in own revenues, but not enough to fully
cancel out the increase in expenditures; also, the declining trend in
central transfers over the decade has not helped in containing the deficits.
The manner of financing the fiscal deficits also throws some
light on the fiscal management. Table 2 provides the necessary data. Of
course, at the state level, it is well-known that fiscal deficits have to be
11
Table 2: Financing of Fiscal Deficit in Kerala
            (Rs. Crore)
 2000-01 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12
 (RE)
Fiscal Deficit 3878 4182 3822 6100 6345 7872 7731 11300
Financed by:
Public Debt (net) 2091 4001 4253 4211 5271 4850 5214 8062
Contingency Fund (net) 0 13 2 -80 74 -20 -8 0
Public Account (net) 1907 331 -288 1891 915 3062 2525 2760
Withdrawal of Cash Balances -120 -163 -145 78 85 -20 0 478
Source: Budget in Brief, 2012-13, Kerala.
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financed by some kind of debt/liability or another. What the table shows
is essentially the financing by the type of liability in each year. As can
be seen, the two main sources are internal debt and public accounts.
While the financing of fiscal deficit with internal debt is relatively
straightforward, that with funds from public accounts has an added
dimension. Since public accounts reflect the operations of a government
acting more or less like a bank, financial safety requires that if money is
taken out of it in any year, it should be replenished as early as possible
– draining the public accounts is against financial integrity. The funds
in the public account are not meant to be a regular source of financing
the government’s day-to-day expenditures. In practice, the state
government has withdrawn substantial amounts from the public accounts
in every year except 2006-07 since 2005-06; the amounts have also
been rather hefty in the last three years. Clearly, this adds to the financial
instability of the government and puts a question mark on the role of the
government as a banker.
2. Indebtedness
Fiscal deficits at the state level can be met only in two ways –
by liquidating assets or by incurring some kind of financial liability,
since the option of deficit financing is not available at the state level. As
such, any state running persistent fiscal deficits is likely to have a
relatively high level of indebtedness, defined broadly as all liabilities
that have to be paid back at varying rates of interest (including zero).
The accounting definition of debt does not include the public account
liabilities, but these are a part of the indebtedness in fact, and should be
considered as such.
Figure 2 provides the trend of fiscal liabilities over the reference
period. It also depicts the quantum of one of the major contingent
liabilities, viz. the guarantees outstanding (except for the last year, for
which no data on guarantees outstanding was available). It can be seen
from the graph that the fiscal liabilities were at a high level of about 34
13
percent of GSDP at the start of our reference period, rising further to
about 38 percent before levelling off and declining to a level of below
29 percent in 2011-12 (revised estimates). It may be noted that it remains
higher than the Finance Commission recommended 25 percent of GSDP
and the decline needs to be maintained for some more time, although
the declining trend clearly allays the fear of ‘exploding’ debt levels and
also unsustainability to a great extent.
High indebtedness causes a vicious circle of higher interest burden,
leading to higher deficits and then on to further borrowing to finance
the higher deficits. It therefore is fortunate that this circle did not come
into play in the state, helped by various factors including smaller deficits,
softening of interest rates, debt relief and rescheduling by the Government
of India (GoI) pursuant to Finance Commission recommendations, and
possibly better debt management also. All types of liabilities do not
bear the same interest rate, and one of the aspects of good debt
management is to exploit various debt instruments in ascending order
of interest rates, using that with the lowest interest rate to the maximum
Figure 2
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extent possible and so on. The substitution of Plan loans from GoI (the
major part of indebtedness to GoI) by market borrowings has also helped
to keep interest costs at a lower level because the latter source had lower
interest costs. Market borrowings, as a result, have increased from about
17.5 percent at the end of 2001-02 to more than 41 percent at the end of
2011-12 as a share of total outstanding liabilities. The share of small
savings loans (NSSF), probably the most expensive in terms of interest
costs, has also come down from almost 16 percent in 2004-05 to 12
percent in 2011-12 (Table 3). Of course, greater reliance is placed on the
less expensive state’s own small savings scheme, as reflected in the
figures at row C(i). The benefit of all this is easily seen in the fact that
interest payments as a ratio of revenue expenditures has declined from
21.34 percent in 2001-02 to 16.41 percent in 2010-11, and further to
14.11 percent in 2011-12, creating fiscal space to that extent. As a ratio
of GSDP, the decline was from 2.95 percent to 2.05 percent, and then to
1.95 percent in 2011-12 (RE).
The graph (Figure 2) also shows the striking decline in the
guarantees outstanding, reducing the financial risk of the state
government substantially. However, there are other types of contingent
liabilities like bills outstanding, accumulated losses of public sector
undertakings and amounts under litigation. While reliable and up-to-
date information on these are not available in the public domain, these
are also likely to be significant; one can only hope that these types of
contingent liabilities are also on the decline.
All states have both financial liabilities and assets. While there
is no prescription of financial prudence that says such prudence increases
monotonically with the coverage of financial liabilities by financial
assets (too much of financial assets could simply signify idle resources
that could be utilised to build up physical assets), there is usually an ill-
defined but reasonably well-approximated optimum for each state that
is required to liquidate at least a substantial part of the liabilities, when
15
Table 3: Components of  End-Year Outstanding Fiscal Liabilities of Kerala
(%)
  2001 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012 (RE)
A. Internal Debt, of which 29.61 49.50 58.54 57.78 58.83 60.33
(i) Market Borrowings 17.47 21.94 32.07 34.61 37.27 41.39
(ii) Special Securities issued to NSSF 3.93 16.10 17.92 15.64 14.28 12.10
(iii) Loans from Banks and Fin. Instn.s 2.46 11.47 8.55 7.53 7.28 6.84
B. Loans and Advances from Govt. of India 23.69 12.36 9.06 8.40 7.71 7.06
C. Public Account 46.59 37.94 32.26 33.72 33.38 32.54
 (i) Small Savings, Provident Funds etc. 39.57 33.78 27.82 28.37 28.84 28.19
(ii) Reserve Funds 0.35 0.74 0.63 0.40 0.39 0.30
(iii) Deposits and Advances 6.68 3.42 3.80 3.94 4.15 4.04
D. Contingency Fund 0.10 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.07
E. Total Liabilities (A to D) (Rs. Crore) 25754 43786 66305 75055 82486 93404
Source: Based on data from Budget in Brief 2012-13.
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called for. Table 4 provides comparative data on the ratio of financial
assets to liabilities in selected states of India.
Table 4: Ratio of Financial Assets to Liabilities in Selected States of
India
(%)
State 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
West Bengal 30 28 26
Punjab 43 41 39
Kerala 39 39 41
Rajasthan 70 67 71
Gujarat 74 71 72
Uttar Pradesh 67 73 77
Haryana 88 80 77
Maharashtra 77 76 78
Tamilnadu 82 81 80
Jharkhand 83 85 89
Andhra Pradesh 89 92 94
Odisha 86 89 96
Goa 90 90 98
Karnataka 114 105 109
Bihar 104 109 118
Madhya Pradesh 101 109 118
Chhattisgarh 122 125 143
Source:  Union and State Finances at a Glance 2010-11,  Comptroller
and Auditor General of India, New Delhi
The table shows the ratio of financial assets to liabilities in Kerala
as the third lowest, and what is more, around 40 percent only. West
Bengal has the lowest ratios in all three years for which data are reported
here, with Punjab roughly in the same position as Kerala. Apart from
these three states (it may be pertinent to recall that these states alone
17
were considered particularly ‘fiscally stressed’ by the last Finance
Commission), the lowest ratios are in Rajasthan, but at a substantially
higher level of around 70 percent. Obviously, the first three states are in
a precarious position with respect to coverage of financial liabilities
with financial assets.
3. Expenditures
One of the consequences of the special emphasis put on social
infrastructure and welfare by the state is that the structure of expenditures
gets heavily biased towards revenue expenditures. Such a policy also
has a tendency to create vested interests in the continuation of the same
policy ad infinitum. Whether this is the case in Kerala or not is a moot
point; for our purposes, it suffices to note that given limited resources,
and the state’s clear preference for social infrastructure and welfare,
revenue expenditures overwhelmingly dominate total expenditures, with
capital expenditures traditionally accounting for a very small share
(Figure 3). The third category of expenditures, loans and advances,
   Figure 3
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account for an even smaller share and are dominated by loans of doubtful
utility to various public enterprises that are often known to be not in a
position to repay them anytime in the foreseeable future. In recent years
(2007-08 onwards), loans and advances are further shrinking while capital
expenditures have increased a little.
The low levels of capital expenditures, although dominated by
economic services, have been partly responsible for the relatively poor
industrialization of the state, as has been previously noted by other
authors. This conceptually raises the problem of limited base for raising
revenues; the extent of its applicability to Kerala is examined later
while discussing revenue performance of the state. But apart from this
possible implication for the fisc, the relatively low degree of
industrialization implies a low growth of employment opportunities
outside the traditional agriculture and services sector. This particular
aspect is more important for the state given its high level of
unemployment as indicated by the number of persons registered in
Employment Exchanges seeking jobs relative to the working population.
The dominance or otherwise of the social services in total
expenditures can be easily and directly checked by examining the
distribution of total (revenue + capital) expenditures by functional
groups. Figure 4 presents the relevant trends over the reference period,
and it can be seen that the distribution is fairly stable at around 40
percent for general services (including interest payments), around 35
percent for social services and about 20 percent for economic services.
From 2006-07, transfers to local bodies accounts for 7-8 percent of total
expenditures4; till 2005-06 its share was negligible and the share of the
other three were roughly proportionately higher. The expenditure share
confirms the policy bias in favour of social services. Equally important,
4. Transfers to local bodies under specific functional categories are included
under respective functional categories – these are essentially general purpose
transfers.
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it is to be noted that the share of general services appears to be unduly
large (even conceding that a large part of the same consists of interest
payments); what is more, although the share of interest payments has
shrunk substantially over the reference period, that of general services
has declined only marginally. This implies that the fiscal space created
by the smaller share of interest payments has largely been devoured by
expanding and/or more expensive administrative machinery with hardly
any increase in developmental expenditure.
Figure 4
As is to be expected from the predominance of revenue
expenditures in total expenditures, the shares seen above largely reflect
the same in revenue expenditures alone, as depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5
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Another interesting issue relates to the available fiscal space
for discretionary developmental expenditures. A large part of state level
public expenditures often consists of contractual expenditures; these
include salaries, wages and pensions (other retirement benefits too), and
interest payment at the minimum. These are inflexible in the short run;
expenditures in the nature of entitlements add to the inflexibility.
However, in practice entitlements are not fully inflexible, and hence we
do not include them here in contractual expenditures. It is only after
meeting the minimum contractual expenditures that any choice regarding
expenditure allocation can be exercised. Thus, it is instructive to examine
the pre-emption of expenditures by these minimum contractual
expenditures. Figure 6 provides the necessary information with respect
to revenue expenditures, given the predominance of revenue expenditures
in the total.
Figure 6
The figure shows that the degree of inflexibility in the
expenditures has declined over the reference period from about three-
quarters at the beginning of the reference period to around two-thirds at
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the end.5 This is a welcome trend as it makes space for more of truly
developmental expenditures; ways of further improving this flexibility
have to be explored continuously.6 At the same time, it should be noted
that entitlement programmes also increase inflexibility in expenditure
allocation, and an open-ended overly generous programme like rice at
Re. 1/Rs. 2 per kg. can potentially be disastrous for financial stability in
a state like Kerala where the very success of the government in terms of
the coverage of the public distribution system (PDS) can become its
enemy, driving the subsidy bill on this count to a high level in a short
time. In fact, the phenomenal growth of the food subsidy bill of the state
government in the last 3/4 years bears testimony to this apprehension.
4. Revenue Receipts
Revenue receipts are dominated by tax revenues in most states
of India, and Kerala is not an exception to this. Also, the popular
perception and public policy being heavily influenced by the ‘welfare
state’ concept, non-tax revenues are not large. Again this is in conformity
with most of the states in India. The other two sources of revenue receipts
are shared taxes and grants from the Union government, and hence
largely exogenously determined. The broad structure of revenue receipts
(Figure 7) thus has little that is remarkable or special to Kerala.
5. This is likely to change for the worse, at least temporarily, with the
implementation of pay revision; this would apply to pensions too. Unless
there is an unlikely compensating variation in revenue generation, the
contractual expenditures may claim about 75 percent of revenue expenditures
again for at least 2-3 years.
6. Once the funded pension scheme kicks in substantially with respect to
actual pension payments, the flexibility should improve commensurately,
but that is a long way off yet.
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Figure 7
Total revenue receipts have been fluctuating between 10 and 12
percent of GSDP throughout the reference period. This is actually lower
than several states in India, but of those not many have higher own
revenues (tax plus non-tax). The central transfers (shared taxes plus
grants) received by the state account for less than half of its own revenues,
which explains the relatively low level of total revenue receipts despite
a relatively high level of own revenues. However, even in terms of own
revenues, Kerala has fallen behind two contiguous states of Tamilnadu
and Karnataka, despite having the advantage of an actual revenue base
(disposable income) larger than the denominator (GSDP) thanks to the
substantial amount of remittances (Table 5). On the other hand, the
share of the secondary sector in the GSDP that is usually positively
related to revenue generation is only around 23 percent in Kerala, which
acts as a constraint on revenue generation. It is the tertiary sector which
has grown much more than any other sector, and this sector contributes
relatively less to the state exchequer.
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Table 5:  Tax GSDP Ratio of Selected States
(Percentage)
State Average of Average of
 1999-2002  2008-11
Andhra Pradesh 7.27 7.90
Bihar 4.24 5.33
Chhattisgarh 6.38 7.21
Goa 6.80 6.20
Gujarat 7.74 6.58
Haryana 7.78 6.23
Jharkhand 4.85 6.32
Karnataka 8.18 9.29
Kerala 7.81 7.77
Madhya Pradesh 5.49 7.47
Maharashtra 7.49 6.82
Odisha 5.16 5.54
Punjab 6.73 6.67
Rajasthan 6.14 6.49
Tamilnadu 8.63 8.43
Uttar Pradesh 5.45 6.63
West Bengal 4.22 4.28
Source:  Annexure 7.9 of 12th Finance Commission Report for 1999-
2002 and computed (2008-11). Tax data are from Finance
Accounts and GSDP data from CSO for both sets of years.
The low levels of non-tax revenues result from several factors like
small interest receipts, negligible amount of dividends received and
low levels of user charges. Attempts have been made in the past to
examine this aspect and take corrective action, but none of these has
had much of revenue impact. While its revenue potential from physical
infrastructure services is limited in Kerala until it makes substantial
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investments, areas like tourism7, forestry and wildlife, health and minor
minerals could possibly be tapped for higher levels of non-tax revenues.
The central transfers have been low mainly because of two factors: (a)
the formula for the inter se distribution of several of these transfers
including the biggest one of shared taxes is progressive in nature; Kerala,
being a middle income state, does not receive a large share; (b) many of
the centrally sponsored schemes and central plan schemes effectively
bypass Kerala by their very nature (the high literacy rate of Kerala makes
it a non-focus state for Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, to cite an example and
the relatively low incidence of poverty causes smaller allocations of all
poverty alleviation programmes, to cite another).8
Like most other states of India, again, the largest share of tax
collections are from sales tax/VAT (Figure 8). On an average, this tax
contributed more than 70 percent of the own tax revenue. The category
of stamp duties and registration fees is a distant second followed by
state excise and motor vehicle taxes. Taxes on the agricultural sector
(land revenue and agricultural income tax) contribute an insignificant
share despite the presence of plantations of several cash crops. In the
area of taxation, the biggest concern at this moment is a successful
transition to the proposed Goods and Services Tax (GST), but the
uncertainties surrounding this transition have proved to be rather
frustrating. A destination based GST in the place of origin-based
elements like the central sales tax would be highly advantageous for a
7. The previous experience with direct government interventions in supplying
tourist infrastructure, particularly hotels, may justifiably cause some derision
with this suggestion. It is not my intention to suggest that the state should
have more of the same; rather, it is suggest that the government could
probably do better by tying up with private sector in this area. Properly
negotiated deals should rake in much more revenues for the government
than on its own steam and salvage the investments already made now that
the government has successfully established Kerala as a major tourist
destination.
8. This is a point made by the Kerala Public Expenditure Review Committee
(Second) too in their report of June, 2010.
25
net importing state like Kerala, and should raise its revenues. For the
present, the latest budget has utilised the two most obvious revenue
raising measures, those of raising the standard 4 percent rate to 5 percent
and 12.5 percent rate to 13.5 percent. However, there is scope to raise
further revenues from two main sources: more appropriate use of the
value added tax, and bringing the mushroom growth of neighbourhood
stores into the tax net. The first point arises mainly because of excessive
use of the compounding system that practically defeats the purpose of
introducing VAT principles, by eschewing proper assessments as also
not covering the entire sales chain. As for the second, most of these
neighbourhood stores report turnovers below registration requirements
for sales tax/VAT, but do have some taxable capacity that should be
tapped. It would probably not be administratively feasible to bring
them under the VAT system, but either a small turnover tax or appropriate
taxation through the local bodies (perhaps through profession tax, or
through license fees) should be feasible.
Figure 8
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The central legislation on stamp duty is also slated for substantial
overhaul, and once this is achieved the state can follow up with its own
legislation to realize higher revenues. Of course, the state will have to
modernise its tax administration too in order to get the full benefit of this
development. In fact, this is an observation that is probably applicable to
much of tax administration in Kerala in general, but such modernisation
has to be tailored to the requirements of each tax separately.
The state has already taken steps to reform the motor vehicle
taxes by basing the taxation of automobiles on price instead of physical
parameters like seating capacity or laden weight. It now needs to decide
the frequency of the tax that it would like to proceed with – one-time tax
or an annual tax. There are pros and cons of both options, but for certain
legal reasons it may be better to opt for an annual tax.
Regarding state excise, the CAG had published a Stand Alone
Report last year that assessed the working of the department. It was of
the opinion that the department took seriously only its role of regulation
and enforcement, and not of a revenue generator. Essentially, bulk of the
revenues flow from the public sector distributor of foreign liquor – the
Beverages Corporation – without much effort, and other revenues are
minimal, implying little effort from the department. For example,
revenues from country liquor (arrack) and country fermented liquor
(toddy) are very small, nowhere near commensurate with the
consumption of the same. The above report believed that substantial
additional revenues could be generated by the department with only a
little extra effort.
Among other taxes, the main problem with electricity duty relates
to its regular collection by the state electricity board without regular
transmission of the same to the government. This happens to such an
extent that although on paper the SEB is the largest generator of profits
among the public sector undertakings in the state (pushing up
profitability of the public sector enterprises as a whole), much of these
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profits may disappear if the improper retaining of electricity duty
collected were to be eliminated. Apart from making a dent in the revenue
receipts of the government, this practice has the added disadvantage of
breeding some complacency about the functioning of the SEB.
5. Concluding Observations
The preceding brief survey of the state finances of Kerala over
the last ten years indicates a broad outline of fiscal policy to be adopted
over the medium term, on which there seems to be some amount of
consensus. The prime mover of this policy ought to be a significant step
up of public investments in infrastructure services as a prelude to an
industrialization drive without introducing any sudden major shock to
the social infrastructure and welfare activities. For this, it is necessary
that the capital expenditures be stepped up significantly and persistently.
If at least revenue balance is maintained (revenue deficit ≤  0) and no
substantial surplus is targeted, this will automatically meet the concerns
of social infrastructure and welfare activities, since these are almost
entirely embedded in revenue expenditures. This would allow the entire
fiscal deficit (increase in liabilities) to be utilised for the required
investments in physical infrastructure. In terms of both the Medium
Term Fiscal Plan of the state and the adjustment path recommended by
the 13th Finance Commission, this would allow 3.5 percent of GSDP for
2012-13 and 3 percent thereafter, to be invested in physical infrastructure.
But this is unlikely to be anywhere near adequate, necessitating
leveraging of these resources with private investments for the identified
projects, perhaps through the PPP route. Splitting projects into separate
tasks to be handled by government/private sector on their own is also a
possibility.
Any increase in revenue receipts or savings in expenditures that
can create a revenue surplus will be a welcome additional source of
funds; this is not totally unrealistic since there is scope for raising
resources through better tax administration and policies (by its own
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standards, tax performance in Kerala has slipped in the last decade) and
appropriate calibration of non-tax revenues (even ignoring the state
lotteries). However, although some researchers believe that “… the state
has not been able to make any headway in correcting its fiscal imbalance
on the revenue side though expenditure growth has been moderated”
(Nambiar, 2009), this is not quite correct, as seen above. There are
possibilities of economising on expenditures also that need to be
assessed and acted upon; for example, a detailed assessment of
requirement of schools, their capacity and number of teachers required
is likely to throw up a significant amount of excess capacity in the
public sector9 – this can be the basis for a properly formulated plan for
gradually reducing the excess capacity. There are also significant gains
to be had from an aggressive reform programme of public enterprises.
Unfortunately, despite setting up Committees with such an intent, the
actual progress is very much like ‘one step forward, two steps backward’.
George and Krishnakumar (2012) also point out some bad practices
(like parking funds booked as expenditures in various deposits without
actually spending them) in the area of financial management that go
towards inflating expenditures. The Public Expenditure Review
committees have also made some suggestions (e.g., monitoring the receipt
of due amounts from various central transfers and monitoring the effective
utilisation of centrally sponsored schemes, or raising the retirement
age) that need to be seriously considered for implementation.
Further additional resources can be had by raising loans through
public enterprises; however, this is a risky proposition given the track
record of the public enterprises and it would be of utmost importance to
ensure a realistically projected revenue stream that would at least cover
the debt servicing costs, for each investment project. This requires a
9. The well-known issue of ‘protected’ teachers and lecturers provides a pointer
in this direction, but their numbers may underestimate the true excess
capacity.
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thorough project appraisal system that has to be introduced as an
institutional reform as soon as possible.
Although the falling liabilities/GSDP ratio allays any fears
regarding debt sustainability in at least the medium term, the extremely
low coverage of financial liabilities by similar assets does underscore
the financial fragility of the state government. The basic cure has to
come from efforts keeping the fiscal deficit low, which would
automatically reduce the level of liabilities and improve the coverage
with the same level of financial assets. Debt management of the
government also has to be improved to deliver a debt package at the
lowest feasible cost. Costly sources of debt like NSSF funds (which
seems to be still the second largest source of internal debt) or those from
NCDC have to be kept at the minimum feasible level, relying as much as
possible on cheaper debt such as market borrowings. Kerala also has its
own indigenous public debt instrument of Treasury Deposits, which
appears to be a cheap source of funds, helping to keep the cost of debt
lower than what it would be otherwise.
The story of public finances in Kerala over the last ten years shows
a significant improvement with respect to various parameters starting
from a crisis-like situation. This story has one moral for our purposes: if
matters could be improved significantly from such a bad situation as
depicted in the White Paper, why should further improvements be not
possible from a healthier base, when the scope for it exists?
The author is a Professor at National Institute of Public
Finance and Policy, New Delhi. While he has worked on
several aspects of public economics in his research
spanning more than thirty years, he has an abiding
interest in sub-national finances and fiscal federalism.
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ANNEXURE
[All budgetary data are from Finance Accounts of Kerala (various issues),
except those for the year 2011-12 (RE), which are from the budget
documents of Kerala, 2012-13.]
Table A.1:  Deficits as Ratio of GSDP
(%)
Year Revenue Deficit Fiscal Deficit Primary Deficit
2001-02 -3.09 -3.88 -0.93
2002-03 -4.39 -5.31 -2.17
2003-04 -3.52 -5.30 -2.11
2004-05 -3.08 -3.73 -0.70
2005-06 -2.29 -3.06 -0.28
2006-07 -1.72 -2.49 0.24
2007-08 -2.16 -3.48 -1.01
2008-09 -1.83 -3.13 -0.83
2009-10 -2.16 -3.39 -1.11
2010-11 -1.33 -2.79 -0.74
2011-12 (RE) -1.67 -3.46 -1.51
Table A.2: Fiscal Liabilities as a Ratio of GSDP
(%)
Year   Fiscal Liabilities Guarantees Outstanding
2001-02 34.44 14.02
2002-03 35.94 13.43
2003-04 37.51 13.39
2004-05 36.64 10.33
2005-06 34.95 8.72
2006-07 33.92 6.12
2007-08 33.18 4.75
2008-09 32.59 3.75
2009-10 31.94 3.23
2010-11 29.75 2.68
2011-12 (RE) 28.59 N.A.
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Table A.3: Allocation of   Revenue Expenditure
(Rs. Crore)
Year General Social Economic  Grants-in-aid
Services Services  Services  and
Contributions
2001-02 5611 4076 1908 67
2002-03 6678 5038 2982 58
2003-04 7398 5025 2999 73
2004-05 7986 5879 3307 -3
2005-06 8756 5896 3772 0
2006-07 9723 6478 2712 1912
2007-08 12184 7790 2819 2099
2008-09 12667 9363 3929 2265
2009-10 13935 10467 4241 2489
2010-11 15418 12111 4357 2778
2011-12 (RE) 19022 16090 6498 3450
Table A.4: Allocation of  Total Expenditure
(Rs. Crore)
Year General Social Economic Grants-in-aid
 Services Services  Services and
Contributions
2001-02 5637 4135 2381 67
2002-03 6719 5121 3557 58
2003-04 7438 5081 3543 73
2004-05 8028 5969 3857 -3
2005-06 8826 6029 4386 0
2006-07 9763 6594 3459 1912
2007-08 12241 7925 4102 2099
2008-09 12720 9654 5281 2265
2009-10 14002 10830 5870 2489
2010-11 15537 12590 7123 2778
2011-12 (RE) 19311 16727 10521 3450
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Table A.5:  Total Expenditure by Categories
(Rs. Crore)
Year Disbursement Capital Revenue
of Loans and Expenditure  Expenditure
Advances
2001-02 160 558 11662
2002-03 250 699 14756
2003-04 1292 640 15495
2004-05 196 682 17169
2005-06 287 817 18424
2006-07 349 903 20825
2007-08 893 1475 24892
2008-09 984 1696 28224
2009-10 877 2059 31132
2010-11 762 3364 34665
2011-12 (RE) 974 4949 45060
Table A.6: Committed Revenue Expenditures
(Rs. Crore)
Year Revenue Salaries  Pensions Interest Other
  Expenditure   Payments  Rev Exp
2001-02 11662 4164 1838 2489 3171
2002-03 14756 4250 2283 2947 5276
2003-04 15495 5048 2409 3328 4710
2004-05 17169 5336 2601 3613 5619
2005-06 18424 5653 2861 3799 6111
2006-07 20825 6638 3295 4190 6702
2007-08 24892 7694 4925 4330 7943
2008-09 28224 9064 4686 4660 9814
2009-10 31132 9799 4706 5292 11335
2010-11 34665 11178 5767 5690 12030
2011-12 (RE) 45060 15763 7731 6358 15208
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Table A.7:  Revenue Receipts by Categories
(% of GSDP)
Year Own Tax Non-Tax Shared Grants
Revenue  Receipts  Taxes  from GoI
2001-02 7.03 0.64 1.91 1.16
2002-03 7.77 0.72 1.82 1.00
2003-04 7.73 0.77 1.92 0.87
2004-05 7.52 0.69 2.02 1.10
2005-06 7.15 0.68 1.84 1.51
2006-07 7.77 0.61 2.09 1.36
2007-08 7.80 0.69 2.31 1.24
2008-09 7.89 0.77 2.11 1.33
2009-10 7.58 0.80 1.89 0.96
2010-11 7.84 0.70 1.86 0.79
2011-12 (RE) 8.10 0.84 1.89 1.29
34Table A.8: Own Tax Revenues by Categories
(Rs. Crore)
Year Taxes on Taxes on State Taxes on Stamps and Land Other Taxes
Agricultural  Sales, Excise Vehicles  Registration  Revenue
 Income  Trade, etc.  Fees
2001-02 2 4441 541 452 394 35 59
2002-03 6 5343 663 513 487 38 253
2003-04 9 5991 656 586 550 40 257
2004-05 5 6701 746 610 775 44 82
2005-06 6 7038 841 629 1101 44 120
2006-07 10 8563 953 708 1520 47 141
2007-08 22 9372 1169 853 2028 47 178
2008-09 12 11377 1398 937 2003 48 215
2009-10 28 12771 1515 1131 1896 54 230
2010-11 47 15833 1700 1331 2552 56 202
2011-12 (RE) 15 19428 2088 1419 3120 119 257
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